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In this study a utility maximizing model is developed which
accommodates changing states of information. Rational consumer choices
in one state of information can lead to realizing different levels of
utility than anticipated, Differences between these levels of utility
suggest a measure for the value of information. This framework is
applied to estimating the potential cost of possible inaccuracies in the
EPA fuel-economy ratings. Survey data collected from new car buyers then
are used to infer the magnitude of the actual costs that may be caused
by the present EPA information,THE COST OF INACCURATE CONSUMER INFORMATION:
THE CASE OF THE EPA MILEAGE FIGURES
Although assumed by traditional economic theory, consumers frequently
possess less than perfect information when they make their purchase decisions.
A consumer’s post-purchase experience with product performance may signi-
ficantly diverge from his or her pre-purchase expectations concerning the
product. A learning process can close the gap between pre-purchase
expectations and post-purchase realization fairly rapidly for more fre-
quently purchased non-durables and services. However, for durables which
are infrequently purchased and involve a large share of the budget, the
problem can be serious.
Consumer choices based on inaccurate information can lead to
realizing a different level of utility than previously anticipated.
Subsequently, consumer demand for the product can be visualized as shifting
when the true nature of the good becomes apparent after purchase. If the
demand function shifts, changes in consumer surplus occur which can be
used to measure economic losses due to imperfect information. Consumer
surplus may increase or decrease as a movement in the demand curve results
in a positive or negative transfer of wealth, but misallocated resources
always result in some economic loss because the true utility function was
not maximized.
This paper presents a theoretical model of consumer behavior which
accommodates changing states of information. The model builds on earlier
work by Peltzman (1973), who analyzed the welfare effects of imPerfect
information. The concept of differences in perceived and realized charac-
teristics of products was used by Kotowitz and Mathewson (1979). In2
addition, others such as Auld (1972) and Colantoni, Davis and Swaminuthan
(1976) have analyzed the effects misinformation about product characteristics
can have on consumer demand and subsequent welfare. Previous work has not,
however, conceptualized the effect of different states of information as
changing the parameters of the utility function.
The empirical analysis in this study addresses the cost incurred due
to inaccurate automobile gasoline mileage information. Gasoline price
increases have made accurate information concerning mileage increasingly
important. Purchases based on imperfect gas mileage information will
result in a discrepancy between the perceived pre-purchase mileage and the
realized post-purchase miles per gallon (mpg). In this analysis the
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) mpg estimates for specific auto-
mobiles are assumed to be the perceived level on which consumers base their
purchase decisions. The EPA estimates are widely publicized as the
official government mileage figures. The mpg levels determined by the
Consumers Union in actual on-the-road driving tests are treated as the
realized figures. The issue of how widely used by consumers the EPA
estimates are was addressed in a survey of new car buyers conducted by
the authors. The final result of this research is an estimate of the
possible cost to society, to consumers, and to producers of inaccuracies
in the EPA mileage estimates.
THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK
The Utility Functions
Consumers are assumed to maximize utility
(1) Max: U= u(X; (3)3
subject to
(2) Y= P’X=O
where X is a vector of goods and services, X = (x1’ .... Xn) & in Rn
+’
6 is a vector of parameters on the utility function and (2) is the usual
budget constraint. 6 reflects consumers’ preferences for elements of X
which have been formed, in part,
the characteristics of each xi.
consumer’s state of knowledge of
by the information they possess about
Hence, @ can be viewed as embodying a
the utility obtainable from Xc~. Prefer-
ences on the set of X in each state of knowledge are assumed complete,
reflexive, transitive, continuous, strictly convex and strongly monotonic.
With perfect information the consumer chooses vector X* to maximize
utility. Let
(3) Uic= U(X*; (3)
denote the result.
With incomplete or inaccurate information the consumer chooses
vector XO to maximize utility. The consumer perceives the result will be
(4) U“ = U(x”; !3°)
where 8° represents the vector of preferences accompanying the state of
information at the time XO was chosen. However, upon consuming XO, the
consumer realizes utility based on the “true” function with parameter
vector (3.~/ The realized utility is given by:
(5) Ue = U(x”; B)
Thus (1) and (2) yield
perceived (U”) and realized
three states of utility, optimum (U*),
(Ue). If ~ # (3°for any element, say 6+3 then
c)>
x - x~. The vector XO is a feasible solution to the constrained maximiza- i<
tion but, by construction, X* is the optimal solution. Hence,
Ue = U(x”; (3): U(X*; (3)= u*4
The difference between realized and optimal utility, resulting from
inaccurate information, suggests a measure for the value of information.
The loss in welfare, U* - UO, can be viewed as the value of perfect infor-
mation, in terms of utility.
Perceived utility (U”) may be greater or less than realized utility
(Ue) depending on the values of ~“ relative to b.
U“ “ U(x”; @o) ; U(x”; B) = Ue
Since (3and 13°reflect mutually exclusive states of knowledge which cannot
exist simultaneously for the consumer, no a priori comparison between (U”)
and (Ue) can be made.
Measuring changes in consumer welfare which occur when the consumer
chooses XO and then discovers that X>cis preferred involves some measure
of changes in consumer surplus. The problems of
as an exact measure of consumer welfare are well




income is both a necessary and sufficient condition for compensating and
equivalent variation and consumer surplus to be equivalent and precise
2/ measures of changes in consumer welfare.— Assuming constant marginal
utility of income simplifies the following exposition by allowing the use
of Marshallian demand functions. Changes in consumer welfare will be
referred to as changes in consumer surplus. The goal is to arrive at the
net welfare loss due to allocative errors resulting from misinformation.
Let the indirect perceived utility function corresponding to (4) be:
(4’) U“= +(P,Y; 6°)
and let the indirect true utility function corresponding to (5) be:
(5’) u*= +(F’,Y;6)05
The perceived Marshallian demand functions corresponding to (4’) are:
(6) X; -&)(P,Y; f3°)/api
= g; (P,Y; !3°)=
31)(P,Y;i3°)/aY
The true Marshallian demand functions corresponding to (5’) are:
Consumer surplus with perfect knowledge of B As:
X*
*-1
(8) CS;= ~i gi (P,Y;B) dxi - Pjx; ~?ig~ (P3y;6) dpi
o
P; -1
where pi is some price of xi for which g; (P,Y;13)= O, and g! is the
1
price inverse of the Marshallian demand function. If information is not
perfect and 6 ~ ~“, xi may be over or under consumed relative to the optimal
choice. Figure 1 illustrates the case where a consumer underestimated the
miles per gallon for automobile xi and consequently underconsumed xi or,
o 3/
alternatively, would have been willing to pay more for x .— i The consumer
realized more utility than s/he perceived. Consumer surplus realized is:
o
x. *-1 FL $:
(9) Cs:= P gi (P,Y;b)dxi - p}: ~ J1 gi (p$y;d)dpi + (Pi - P;)x;
o Pi
Since Ue ~ U*, CS~ - Cs: ~ o. The welfare gain from perfect informa-
tion about xi is:
(lo) Wi = Cs: - Cs:.
In terms of Figure 1, equation (10) is area abc = ‘ba. ~iP~c-piPi Note
that the consumer gained area p~p~ba which can be referred to as a transfer
from producers to consumers. In terms of this study it is the unexpected
savings in expenditures on gasoline over the time the consumer owned
automobile xi.
When gas mileage is overestimated too much automobile is purchased.
Figure 2 illustrates this case where x; > x~. Following equations (8)6
and (9) for the true and realized consumer surplus,





(9’) Cs; = flJ g~(p>y;~)dpj - (P; - P;)x;
‘j
Welfare gain from perfect information in this case is
(lo’) Wj = Cs; - Cs:.
In Figure 2 (10’) is area ~jp~d - ~jp~dba = abd. In this case
consumers transferred to producers area p~p~db which can be interpreted
as the unexpected additional expenditure on gasoline over the time the
consumer owned automobile x.. Area abd can further be interpreted as expen-
J
diture made for which no utility was received. Consumers should, theoretically,
be willing to pay an amount equivalent to area abd for information which
would have allowed them to make decisions along demand curve g~(P,Y;(3).
The implications of an allocative error in the consumer’s choice of
XO are far reaching. If data on
which were selected on the basis
perceived demand functions which
market purchases are contained in XO,
of preferences represented by (3°,it is
are observed. If information and experience
cause consumer beliefs and subsequently (3°to change,the parameters we
frequently attempt to estimate will also change. Consequently, demand
functions based on less than perfect information are not structural in an econo-
metric sense. Furthermore, assuming a budget constraint, an allocative error on
one good means nonoptimal choices of other goods and services as well. It
follows that the total value of consumer welfare gain from exact knowledge
of (3is the summation of the gains ~~ Wi over all goods and services in ~.
The larger the budget share of the good for which the consumer’s knowledge7
of (3is incomplete, or the smaller the elasticity of demand> the greater
can be the error induced in the choice of other goods. The estimation of
a single W. is, therefore, 1




The EPA mileage estimates are extensively referred to in the adver-
tising of new automobiles. By law each new automobile must bear a label
giving the EPA mileage information. The EPA currently provides an estimated
city, combined, and highway mileage figure for each car model, engine, and
transmission configuration. The city figure actually corresponds to mixed
suburban driving and is the figure emphasized by the ‘EPAas most appropriate
for making mileage comparisons. In many cases only the city and highway
estimates are advertised, with the former highlighted.
The EPA mileage estimates are typically presented with the cautionary
note that they are best used for comparisons> that “actual mileage maY
vary due to driving speed, weather, and trip length,” and that “actual
highway mileage will probably be less.” However, both the automotive
manufacturers and the EPA use the estimates in a manner that would seem to
indicate that they represent the mileage the average motorist should expect
to obtain. For example, vehicle ranges on a tank full of gasoline are
calculated based on the EPA estimated mileage and the government’s own
mileage bulletin contains a table that calculates annual fuel costs using
the EPA mileage estimates (Dept. of Energy, 1980, p. 7).8
There are, however, several reasons to be concerned about the use-
fulness of the EPA ratings as they are presented. The EPA numbers are
calculated in a laboratory on a chassis dynamometer, not on the road. The
EPA tests are conducted
panics for testing. In
fuel-economy figures in
on prototypes, which are submitted by the auto cotn-
addition, the EPA may rely on manufacturer reported
some cases, not having the resources for complete
testing. Most consumers are probably unaware of these factors.
The Consumers Union (CU) has serious concerns about the EPA ratings.
The CU states in the April 1980 automotive issues of Consumer Reports:
Aside from the differences in mileage caused by driving
technique, other factors make the mileage estimates by
the EPA less than reliable guides to a car’s actual
mileage (p. 236).
A recent Congressional study concurs with Consumers Union that the
EPA tests provide an inadequate measure of the normal on the road perfor-
mance an average driver can expect. The Chairman of the House Subcommittee
producing the report concluded that “individual consumers are being misled
by inflated fuel economy claims derived from their government’s own test
program” (House of Representatives 1980).
Consumers Union conducts its own on-the-road fuel-economy tests for
a limited number of models. These results are reported in the April auto-
motive issue of Consumers Reports,. They provide mileage figures for driving
in heavy downtown traffic, on an expressway at 55 mph, and for a 195 mile
trip on a mixture of roads. They also report the gallons of fuel the
vehicle would use in 15,000 miles, based on an unweighed average of the
mileage under each of the three driving situations. Their experts believe
the 15,000 mile figure is “the best number to
and should be an important consideration when
use for comparing car mileage
buying a new car” (Consumer ———..——
liiorts, 1980, p. 229). —.9
The analysis in this study assumes that the EPA ratings form the
mileage perception of the consumer prior to purchase and that the CU figures
correspond to the actual mileage realized for the average driver. Since
there is uncertainty as to precisely how individuals use the EPA information,
two comparisons were made. The first compares the unweighed mileage figure
stressed by each organization: the EPA estimated city (mixed suburban)
figure and the CU mileage figure for the 15,000 mile trip. The second com-
parison weights both EPA and CU mileage figures by the types of miles driven
by the average motorist. Based on government data on vehicle miles by road
class, the following weighting factors were used for EPA and CU mpg estimates:
(a) EPA: city (suburban) .63, highway .37; (b) CU: city (downtown) .12,
expressway .37, 195 mile mixed trip .51 (Dept. of Transportation 1979, p. 48).
These two approaches will be referred to as the unweighed and weighted
mpg comparisons. The former simply assumes individuals use the EPA city
estimate as their mileage expectation and realize CU’S mpg for 15,000 miles
in actual use. The latter assumes they use some combination of the city
and highway figures, weighted by driving type, to form their mileage expec-
tations. A similar weighting scheme is applied to CU’S mpg levels to
obtain a realized mileage.
As shown in Table 1, mileage comparisons were made for 44 automobile
4/
models, including engine and transmission configuration.— For example,
for Car (l), an Audi 4000 with a 1.6 liter engine and 4 speed manual trans-
mission, the EPA city figure was 22 mpg, the CU 15,000 mile mpg 27.5, the
weighted EPA figure 26.4 mpg and the weighted CU mpg 29.5. As illustrated
by this example, the EPA estimates did not always overstate realized mileage
according to Consumers Union tests.10




mileage in 20 cases, overstates it in 23 cases, and the two
equal in one case,for the unweighed figures. The difference
EPA and CU mileage is greater than 2 mpg for 18 vehicles; the
difference is less than 1 mpg for 16 vehicles. The largest difference is
5 mpg. With the weighted figures, the EPA estimate understates the CU
mileage in nine cases and overstates it in the remaining 35 cases. With
the mileage figures weighted by types of miles driven, the difference is
greater than 2 mpg for 26 vehicles: the largest discrepancy is 7.9 mpg.
Calculation of Private Costs -- — —.—
Unexpected savings on gasoline purchases will be incurred if the EPA
estimate understates actual mileage and unexpected additional costs will
be incurred if the EPA overstates actual mileage, assuming miles driven remain
constant. To translate the mileage difference into a monetary value requires
making assumptions about the length of operation of the vehicle, the miles
driven per year, and the price of fuel. By assuming a discount rate, the .
present discounted value of the future stream of reduced or increased gasoline
expenditures can be derived. Since assumptions about the future must be
made, including something so uncertain as the future price of gasoline,
the approach of this study was to specify a set of alternative assumptions.
With regard to the time period over which the vehicle is operated,
the average length of time a new car is operated before replacement was
used. The best estimate available for this period is 3-1/2 years, based
on a 1968 study.z/
The average miles traveled per private passenger car per year in
U.S. was 10,046 miles in 1978, the latest year for which the data are
the11
published (Dept. of Transportation, 1979). In addition, data on yearly
travel of all passenger cars as a function of age are available. The
average new passenger car, as reported in a 1977 study, is driven 18,000
miles in the first year, 15,100 in the second, 13,400 in the third, and
12,200 in the fourth year (Dept. of Energy, 1977, P. 97). A large Part of
the reason that mileage is so high in the initial years is that a sizable
portion (57 percent) of new vehicles are purchased for
average business vehicle is driven more miles per year
years than the average household vehicle.
made based on these two assumptions about
10,046 miles and a declining figure based





annual mileage: a constant
on age.
interest rates, the choice of
a reasonable long-term discount rate was unclear. Therefore, two
alternatives were specified: 10 and 12.6 percent. The latter figure was
the effective annual yield on a 2-1/2 year plus savings certificate at a
commercial bank in mid-April, 1980.
Finally, and perhaps the most difficult to predict was the price of
gasoline over the following four years. An average price of $1.27 per
gallon for unleaded regular was used as the base gasoline price (National
Consumer Finance Association, 1980). The price of unleaded gasoline was
used since most new cars require this fuel. Three of the 44 vehicles
analyzed used diesel fuel, in which case an average price of $1.14 per gal-
lon was assumed for 1980. Alternative calculations were made assuming price
increases of 10, 15, and 20 percent per year. The annual increase in the
price of gasoline averaged 16 percent over the five-year period from
December 1975 to December 1980 and 35 percent between December 1978 and
December 1980 based on the Consumer Price Index.12
With these assumptions, alternative estimates of the present value
of unexpected gasoline savings or additional expenditures due to the gap
between expected and realized miles per gallon can be calculated. This
unexpected savings or increase in the operating cost of the vehicle would
result in the “true” demand function, based on perfect information, falling
to the right or left of that perceived.
For the case in which the EPA underestimated actual mileage, the
distance ab in Figure 1 measures the shift in demand from g~(P,Y;6°) to
g~(P,Y;13)and is equal to the present value of the unexpected reduction in
gasoline expenditures. If consumers had perfect mileage information,
instead of an underestimate, the retail price of the vehicle could have
been raised by p~p~ and Ox; units would still have been purchased. Alter-
natively, the present value of unanticipated savings on gasoline can be
conceived of as a rebate reducing the purchase price of the vehicle by an
equivalent amount.
If the EPA overestimated actual mileage, the distance bd in Figure 2
*
measures the demand shift from g~(P,Y;(3°)to gj(P,Y;B) and is equal to
the present value of the unexpected increase in gasoline expenditure. In
Figure 2, with perfect information instead of an overestimate, the retail
price would have to have been reduced by p~p~ to sell Ox” units. Unanti-
J
cipated additional gas expenditures can be viewed as a surcharge increasing
the purchase price.
As an example, Vehicle (1) in Table 1, the Audi 4000, with an
EPA estimate of 22 mpg and CU figure of 27.5, has a present value of un-
expected gasoline savings of $639.57 using the declining annual mileage
levels, assuming a discount rate of 10 percent and gasoline price increases
of 15 percent. A purchaser of this vehicle, who had underestimated13
mileage by 5.5 mpg, received an unexpected gain of $640 on the operating
costs of this car. Therefore, he or she should have been willing to pay
a retail price $640 higher based on the higher mileage estimate. This
study assumes that consumers possess perfect
vehicle characteristics, so that the cost of
isolated.
information about all other
mpg misinformation can be
Calculation of AIIocative Loss
Whether consumers have positive or negative costs (transfers)
associated with misinformation about mpg, they will have misallocated
resources by purchasing a non-optimum amount of car. The allocation error
as defined by equation (10) is the difference between consumer surplus under
the true demand curve and that realized with the initial purchase (x; or
x;). In the aggregate it represents the net social welfare loss due to
misallocated resources resulting from imperfect information.
Based on the assumption that the EPA mileage ratings represent the
information upon which consumer’s form preferences for new automobiles and
CU mileage estimates represent the mileage realized while using the auto-
mobile, welfare losses from misallocated resources due to imperfect mileage
information were estimated. In Figures 1 and 2 the net welfare loss
triangles abc and adb, respectively, can be computed using geometry and
the elasticity formula. Solving the elasticity formula (AX/dP.P/X) for AX
and substituting into the formula for the area of a triangle (1/2 AP AX)
yields:
e xAp2
abc or adb = ~ 2p
where e is the price elasticity of demand, x is original demand and p is
P
original price. Original demand is Ox; in Figure 1 and ~~ in Figure 2.
The original priCe iS Op~ and op~, respectively.
J14
To estimate aggregate allocative losses, data on prices, quantity,
and the elasticity of demand were required. Automobile prices were
reported in the April 1980 automotive issue of Consumer Reports, The
prices utilized in this study were derived by averaging the dealer cost
and list price for each automobile with the options CU suggests buying.
This averaging was done to reflect the discounting from list price that
typically occurs on new automobile sales,
The quantity figures for each of the 44 vehicle types are based on
an annualized version of sales reported for the six month period October 1979
through March 1980 (Automotive News, 1979 and 1980). Monthly auto sales
are given by major model type for domestic producers and by manufacturer
.
only for foreign producers. Data on sales of foreign cars by model type
and both foreign and domestic cars by engine and transmission type were
available for 1978 (Ward’s Yearbook, 1979). This information was used to
weight the 1979-80 sales figures to obtain estimated sales figures for the
44 specific model, engine, and transmission type vehicles studied. For
example, Datsun 210’s represented 40 percent of all Datsun sales in 1978.
Therefore, a weight of .40 was used to obtain Datsun 210 sales as a func-
tion of all Datsun sales in 1979-80. In 1978, 41.2 percent of Chevette’s
were sold with 4 speed manual transmissions and all are equipped with four
cylinder engines. Again, this proportion was applied to 1979-80 to get a
sales estimate for the specific vehicle for which mileage comparisons were
available. General Motors’ X-Car (Chevrolet Citation) Series was not
produced in 1978. The proportions to apply to various engine and trans-
mission types were, therefore, determined by looking at similar vehicles.
The cost estimates developed in this study are for the 1980 model year,
6/
assuming a rate of passenger car sales of 9.8 million vehicles.—15
Model specific price elasticity estimates would be desirable. However,
the overall elasticity of demand for automobileswas the best approximation
available. Because of the possibility of substitution between models the
specific elasticities would probably be greater than the aggregate estimate.
Previous aggregate estimates of e have ranged from -.6Olto -1.0 by Chow
P
(1960, p. 160),to -1.35 by Weiserbs (Phlips, 1974, p. 195), with Houthakker &
Taylor (1966) estimating approximately -.92, and Sexauer (1977) finding
-1.05. Based on all these studies, the most reasonable estimate of a




value of the allocative loss and private
costs for individual vehicle
assume a 15 percent gasoline
and declining annual mileage
types are presented on Table
price increase, a 10 percent





unweighed EPA estimated city figure and the unweighed CU 15,000 mile









;hevrolet Impala, are zero since the EPA and CU mpg estimates are equal.
Z3 car model types the transfer is from consumers to producers, since
EPA estimate exceeds the CU figure. For 20 others the transfer is
producers to consumers.
The largest transfers from consumers occur on some of the larger
fuel-efficient domestic vehicles. The largest allocative loss was
million with a transfer to producers of $86.5 million occurring on the
Buick Regal, Car Model (26). The discrepancy between the EPA and CU mileage
estimate was only three miles per gallon, (18 vs. 15); however, weighting16
this figure by a large sales figure of 110,664 produced considerable
aggregate losses in consumer surplus. The aggregate allocative loss for
the 44 model types analyzed was $26.9 million. The transfer to consumers
was $408.9 million and to producers $376.0 million, for a net transfer to
consumers of $32.9 million.
Positive and negative transfers occur on different vehicles and
to different consumers. Since transfers to and from consumers do not cancel
each other out, a distributional inequity occurs, Aggregating the transfers
by country of origin revealed that for the vehicles listed on Table 2,
consumers transferred a net $34,513,118
Foreign car manufacturers transferred a
consumers. Two-thirds of this transfer
to manufacturers of American cars,
net $67,376,436 to American
.
came from Japanese automobile
producers. The allocative error of $26.9 million represents a significant
social welfare loss due to misinformation, which is not recouped by any
market segment.
The car model, engine,
analysis accounted for 33.8
and transmission types covered by this
percent of the total sales of passenger auto-
mobiles during the period covered. If the car models analyzed are assumed
to be a representative sample, these results can be extended to the entire
market. Based on an extrapolation of these results, the estimated alloca-
tive loss and net transfer are three times greater
$80.7 million and $98.7 million, respectively.
Table 3 presents estimates for the allocative
for the entire market;
loss and transfers for
the entire automobile market based on various alternatives concerning the
price of gasoline, the discount rate, and annual mileage. The costs
reported represent the potential impact of the EPA mileage estimates17
assuming all new car purchasers expected to obtain the EPA figures, but
realized the Consumers Union mpg levels. The estimated allocative loss
ranges from $123,9 million to $30.9 million. The magnitude of the alloca-
tive loss is most affected by the assumption regarding annual miles driven:
10,046 miles vs. the age related declining figures, with constant miles
giving the smaller losses. Constant miles are probably the most realistic
for privately owned cars. Another dramatic
the magnitude and direction of the transfer
by types of miles driven. Alternatives (1)
other assumptions held constant, show a net
result is the sensitivity of
to weighting the mpg estimates
and (2) in Table 3, with the
transfer of $98.7 million to
consumers with the unweighed mpg figures and $2,554.9 million to producers with
the weighted mpg figures. This result implies that consumers, on average,
would make smaller allocative errors and be more likely to gain consumer
surplus if they used the EPA city estimate as their expectation of mpg and
did not try to interpolate city and highway EPA figures or otherwise adjust
them for personal driving habits.
Survey Results
A survey of individual new automobile buyers was conducted to obtain
data on the utilization of the EPA ratings by new car buyers. The results
of
as
the survey provide insights into both the importance of the EPA ratings
an information source and how the EPA estimates are used to form expec-
tations. Mail questionnaires were sent to 800 individuals and 440 responses
were received. The survey was conducted in Hennepin County, Minnesota
in September 1980. Hennepin County contains the city of Minneapolis, its
suburbs and some rural outlying areas. Based on the types and quantities
of automobiles purchased, the Hennepin County sample was assumed to be
reasonably representative of new cars purchased for the following analysis.18
In one question the car purchaser was asked to list the most impor-
tant source of information about gasoline mileage prior to buying the car.
The question was open-ended; categories were not listed. Only 7 percent
of the respondents listed the EPA ratings as most important. In addition,
6 percent listed advertisements, 13 percent automobile dealers, and
26 percent automobile evaluation reports. Other sources listed were
friends and relatives, auto magazines, previous experience, and other
owners. The number who directly named the EPA ratings was quite low.
However, ads were required to use the EPA figures if they reported fuel-
economy. The mileage estimates normally supplied by auto dealers would
probably be the EPA figures, which are displayed on the window stickers
and in the promotional literature. Therefore, the proportion who used
the EPA ratings as their primary source of mileage information was at
least 26 percent, and could be as high as 52 percent, if automobile evalua-
tion reports are considered a source of EPA ratings.
The new car buyers in the survey were also asked whether the mileage
they were getting in normal driving was better, worse, or the same as
they expected when the car was purchased. In the overall sample, 27.5
percent responded worse, 23.4 percent better, and 44.7 the same. Of those
who indicated the EPA ratings were their most important information source,
48.5 percent answered worse, 15.2 percent better, and 33.3 percent the
same. For those who relied on the EPA ratings, ads, or auto dealers as
their major information source, 37.7 percent said worse, 23.7 percent
better, and 35.1 percent the same.
The EPA ratings were less reliable than other information sources
and led to overestimates of actual mileage far more frequently. Actual use
of the EPA figures would appear to produce a substantial net transfer from19
consumers to producers. These survey results indicate the cost calcula-
tions based on the weighted mpg comparison are more realistic in terms of
consumer behavior (see Alternative 2, Table 3). The indication is that a
substantial proportion of the car buyers did not simply base their mileage
expectations on the EPA city estimate, but rather on some weighted combina-
tion of the EPA mileage estimates.
Finally, there are important conceptual reasons for arguing the
values of the allocative loss and transfer may underestimate the impact on
individual consumers. First, the shifts in demand captured in this study
are a result only of the monetary gain or loss due to the unanticipated
gasoline savings or additional cost. The pleasant surprise of receiving
better mileage than expected might have a direct positive psychological
impact on consumer satisfaction. The disappointing shock of getting worse
mileage could have a direct negative effect.
Second, the loss is understated since the best that could be done
empirically was to calculate the loss on each vehicle in isolation. How-
ever, a nonoptimal choice on one good produces misallocation on other
goods and services through the budget constraint. To the extent that
mileage misinformation causes consumers to purchase the wrong vehicle
given their preferences, rather than to not purchase one at all, much of
the ensuing additional misallocation is within the automotive group. This
is a partial rather than a general equilibrium analysis.
In terms of the aggregate allocative losses and transfers reported
in Table 3, a caveat is in order. Quantity of automobiles was based on
total sales including those purchased by major fleets and other businesses.
If business purchasers have better information about mpg than individual
consumers, the aggregate numbers in Table 3 can be reduced by 57 percent,20
the proportion of new cars sold for business purposes (Flanagan 1980).
If only 26 percent of individual automobile consumers use the EPA as a
most important source of information and they use it in some weighted
fashion as the survey indicated, the allocative loss can be reduced to
$13.8 million and the net transfer to producers to $284.5 million
7/ (Alternative 2, Table 3).– The aggregate losses and transfers calculated
assumed every new car buyer used the EPA mpg estimates and obtained the
same mpg as CU found in its tests. It appears this may be a reasonable
assumption for somewhere between 11 and 22 percent of all new car buyers.
CONCLUSIONS
In this study a theoretical framework was developed whereby the
parameters of the utility function were allowed to change as preferences
changed with new information. Consequently, a shift in the demand curve
lead to changes in consumer surplus which could be positive or negative
in terms of private transfer costs, but always resulted in some economic
loss due to misallocated resources.
The application of this model to the case of consumer information
about gas mileage on new automobiles produced estimates of a net transfer
to all American car buyers which ranged from -$2,544.9 million to +$103.8
million depending on the underlying assumptions which were made. The cost
to society from misallocated resources ranged from $123.9 million to $30.9
million depending on the same assumptions.
It was found that differences between perceived and realized utility
were smaller when consumers used the EPA city mileage rating to form
expectations than if the estimates were adjusted according to driving
habits. Survey results indicated, however, that consumers tended to weight
the EPA number with other information, exacerbating the errors.21
Government policy has mandated EPA mileage ratings as important
information for automobile consumers. Considerable public resources have
been spent testing automobiles to discover their mileage characteristics
and to publicize the results. To the extent that the information is
unreliable, economic losses are magnified by public funds spent to generate
misleading information. On the other hand, the discipline and competition
imposed on the industry by standardized, mandatory information should not
be underestimated. Even though the numbers may not be completely reliable
for an individual consumer’s decisionmaking purpose, there is reason to
believe their ubiquitous existence has aided the general cause of energy




~/ The move assumes consumers acquire perfect information in
period through experience with products comprising XO. In most
whole series of @ vectors exist as the consumer’s states of knowledge
and preferer,cesadjust choices from XO
*
in a gradual convergence towards X ,
~/ This is a strong assumption. Three conditions under which it
holds are outlined by Samuelson (1942). One of the three that is useful
to assume is homoethetic preferences resulting in unitary income elas-
ticities. The practical implication of these assumptions is that the
Marshallian and the Hicksian demand curves converge and measures of changes
in consumer surplus are identical to measures of compensating variation or
equivalent variation.
~/ If xi is a particular type of automobile (x; - x:) can be
thought of as adding more options to xi, i.e. adding an air conditioner
or soundsystem.
~j Twin or equivalent models are included. Therefore, in Table 1,
number 9 includes Mercury Capri, 12 includes Dodge Omni, 15 - Dodge
Challenger, 16 - Chevrolet Monza, 28 - Chrysler LeBaron. 29 - Cadillac
Seville, 30 - 33 - Buick Skylark, Oldsmobile Omega, Pontiac Phoenix, 34 -
36 - Plymouth Volaire, 37 - Mercury Zephyr, 38 - Ford Granada, Lincoln
Versailles, 43 - Chevrolet Caprice, Buick Electra, Buick LeSabre, Oldsmobile
Delta 88, Pontiac Catalina and Bonneville.
~~ Conversation with Mr. R. Grehher, Motor Vehicle Manufacturers
Association, Detroit, Michigan, April 1980.
~/ The best data on vehicle sales for this type of study would
be that which the auto manufacturers must submit to the Department of
Transportation under the Corporate Average Fuel Economy regulations. However,23
this information is not available for public use, since it is considered
confidential.
~f Forty-three percent of consumers buy cars for private use
(Flanagan 1980). Therefore, .43 x .26 x $123.9 million = $13.8 million and
































JTABLE 1. EPA and Consumer Union Mileage Estimates
Miles Per Gallon Miles Per Gallon
Car Make Engine and a, (unweighed) (weighted)





















































































































































































































































































































~/ Symbols: L = liter; 4, 6 or 8 = cylinder; D = diesel engine; A = automatic
transmission; 4M = 4 speed manual; 5M = 5 speed manual.TABLE 2. Estimated Allocative Loss and Transfer by Car Model (in dollars)
Transfer:
Allocative To Consumers (+)
Car Make and Model Loss To Producers (-)
1. Audi 4000
2* Chevrolet Chevette

















20. Toyota Corr. Tercel
21. Toyota Corona


















39 l Mercedes Benz 300







Transfer to Consumers (+)
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